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C
anadian municipal water
agencies are marvels of engi-
neering science. They supply
billions of litres of clean drinking water
reliably to millions of Canadian house-
holds and businesses every day. At the
same time, Canadian municipal water
agencies are in trouble.
On average, they lose or cannot account for 20 percent
of the water leaving their treatment plants. They face a
significant backlog of infrastructure repairs, and
replacement costs have been estimated to be billions of
dollars. They do not know how much water is con-
sumed by the one-quarter of their residential customers
whose water use is unmetered. And, in 2007, the
revenues they earned represented only 70 percent of
their recorded expenditures – which by most accounts
understates the costs of their operations.1
How can one reconcile these two disparate images
of Canadian water-supply agencies? A major part of
the puzzle lies in the fact that water agencies spend a
great deal of time and effort on ensuring water
quality and reliability and less on determining the
correct price of water. While the immediate costs of
making a mistake regarding water quality are much
more severe than those of getting the price of water
wrong, the long-term consequences of mispricing
water are significant, and include excessive con-
sumption, overextended infrastructure, stifled
innovation, and diminished water quality.2
Furthermore, future demand for water is expected to
rise due to increases in population and income,
while water supplies might become less reliable due
to climate change. In the future, then, the costs of
undervaluing water will become more severe. 
The purpose of this Commentary is to document
the underpricing of water, identify its causes and
consequences, and consider options for the
promotion of rational water pricing. Analysts and
researchers have brought the issue of water pricing to
the public’s attention regularly over the past 30 years
with little result. Thus, this Commentary’s discussion
of the options for policymakers pays particular
attention to the informational, institutional, and leg-
islative challenges that confront water-pricing
reforms in Canada. The most important of the
suggested reforms would see municipalities
implement universal residential water metering and
move toward full-cost-accounting methods for water
pricing. Further, water agencies should institute
seasonal surcharges to better reflect the marginal cost
of water use during peak summer months and
amalgamate smaller, high-cost water agencies to
exploit scale economies and promote innovation.
Current Practices
It is important to begin by presenting an accurate
picture of the current state of water pricing in
Canada. The good news is that Environment
Canada regularly surveys municipalities and reports
on their pricing of water-supply and sewage-
treatment services. The bad news is that the most
recent survey (Environment Canada 2008), by
providing data for 2004, is rather out of date. In
addition, the survey’s coverage is uneven:
Environment Canada acknowledges that the
response rate for small towns is rather low, which
skews the results since, as we shall see, small towns
often have the most inefficient price structures. 
Canadian Municipal Water Prices
Canadian water-supply agencies employ a variety of
means to collect revenues from their customers. Some
revenues are simply transfers from the municipal gov-
ernment of which the agency is a part; other revenues,
typically for capital projects, might come from
provincial and federal sources. Most revenues,
however, are collected through charges of various sorts
levied on residential, commercial, industrial, and insti-
tutional customers. These charges include one-time
fees for new accounts, ongoing charges for connection
to the system – which tend to be differentiated across
user groups and by the size of the pipe connecting the
consumer to the network – and water prices. 
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Despite the number and types of revenue sources,
it is clear that the revenues municipal water
suppliers collect are inadequate: over the 1988 to
2007 period, except for 2001, revenues earned by all
municipal water agencies in Canada consistently fell
short of expenditures (Figure 1). What is surprising
about these figures is that, since 2001, the aggregate
ratio of revenues to expenditures has been falling,
and in 2007 stood at only 70 percent. But if users
are not paying the full cost of water supply, someone
else is. In other words, this phenomenon represents
a complex set of undocumented, poorly understood,
and unplanned transfers to one set of Canadians –
water users who are not paying the full cost of their
water service – from another set of Canadians.
What is even more remarkable about these statistics
is that these recorded expenditures understate the
full cost of providing potable water to Canadians.
Capital costs have been undervalued, investment
rates have failed to maintain and replace aging
supply networks, raw water has been obtained for
free, and the economic costs of the environmental
damages arising from sewage operations have gone
unmeasured. Thus, the gap between what
Canadians pay for their water supply and the full
cost of that supply is even greater than the Statistics
Canada data indicate.
One can categorize water agencies according to
whether or not the revenue they receive from an
individual customer depends on the volume of
water the customer uses. It is quite common for
water agencies to charge a preset monthly fee –
often termed a “flat rate” – that provides the
customer a virtually unlimited volume of water.
Some agencies, however, charge a specific price for
each cubic metre of water the customer uses. In
order to levy a price, the agency must measure the
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Figure 1: Revenues and Expenditures of Canadian Municipal Water Agencies, 1988 to 2007
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These prices can be constant (price does not vary
with the volume of water purchased), increasing
(price rises with the volume of water purchased), or
decreasing (price falls with the volume of water
purchased). When price increases or decreases with
the volume of water used, the marginal price (the
price on the last unit consumed) usually changes
discretely. For example, Edmonton’s residential
water rate schedule is composed of a monthly con-
nection fee that varies depending on pipe size
($5.42 for a 16 mm connection and $23.22 for a 50
mm connection) plus an increasing block rate for
consumption. The latter is $1.5362 per cubic metre
for consumption of less than 60 cubic metres per
month and $1.5879 per cubic metre for con-
sumption in excess of 60 cubic metres per month
(EPCOR 2008). 
It does not end there. Water prices can be further
complicated by additional features, including
minimum charges, surcharges for sewage-treatment
services, provisions for lowered prices for some
initial low level of water use, and special charges
meant to build up capital reserves. What is
interesting about Canadian water prices, however, is
that they typically do not exhibit some features that
are commonly found in other regulated or public
agency prices, such as prices that vary according to
time of use, season, or distance. I return to this
important point below.
The distribution of residential water rate
structures across Canadian municipalities is shown
in Table 1. Of the 916 municipalities that
responded to Environment Canada’s most recent
survey of municipal water-pricing practices, slightly
more than half (486) employ flat rates. Residents 
of these towns and cities effectively have access 
to unlimited water use for a preset fee, since the
marginal price (the price they pay for each
additional cubic metre of water) is zero. The
remaining municipalities employ some type of vol-
umetric charge, with constant prices being by far the
most popular choice. A very small number of cities
employ decreasing block rates, and even fewer use
increasing block rates. These figures are somewhat
misleading, however, as the cities that use flat rates
tend to be the smaller ones. In fact, only about a
quarter of Canadian households face flat-rate water
charges, while three-quarters face some type of vol-
umetric charge. Further, because the largest cities
tend to use increasing block rates, one-quarter of
Canadians experience such charges.
An unusual feature of the Canadian municipal
water-supply sector – compared to other types of
public utilities and to water-supply practice in other
countries – is that the water use of many households is
not metered, making it impossible for their water
supplier to charge a volumetric fee. In 1991, only
about half of households had water meters in their
homes. Coverage has slowly increased, to about 63
percent by 2004, but about one-third of Canadian
households are still without water meters. Most of
these households are in eastern Canada – Newfound-
land and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec
have the lowest rates of residential water metering. 
Aside from acting as a barrier to reforming water
prices, the absence of water meters has important
Price Structure Number of Cities % of Population
Flat rate 489 23.4
Volumetric 427 76.6
Constant 304 45.4
Decreasing block rate 84 7.9
Increasing block rate 39 23.3
Table 1: Distribution of Residential Price Structures, 2004
Source: Environment Canada (2008).| 4 Commentary 281
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The factors that influence residential water
demand include climate, house and lot size,
number of family members, income, and price.
It is the last of these that is most relevant here. If
water demand were truly insensitive to water
price, the major issue surrounding the design of
water prices would be whether they generate
enough revenue to finance water agencies'
operations. On the other hand, if demand is
sensitive to price, the potential effect of prices in
determining water consumption levels is
relevant. What is the empirical evidence on the
sensitivity of water demand to price?
Statistical analysis of the relationship of resi-
dential water demand to water price has been
conducted in a variety of contexts and locations.
Taken together, these studies conclude that resi-
dential water demand is inelastic at currently
observed prices. In an analysis of 162 estimates
generated between 1963 and 1993, Espey, Espey,
and Shaw (1997) obtain an average price
elasticity – that is, the expected percentage
change in demand when price increases by 1
percent – of -0.51 percent. Similarly, Dalhuisen
et al. (2003) obtain an average price elasticity of
-0.41 in an analysis of almost 300 price-elasticity
studies conducted over the past 20 years. These
studies also confirm that short-run elasticities are
typically smaller than long-run elasticities – in
other words, demand for water responds more to
higher prices over time, whereas demand is less
flexible to higher prices in the short run – and
that the price sensitivity of outdoor summer
water usage exceeds that of indoor water usage. 
There is a limited amount of evidence that
households respond to the structure of water
prices as well as to their level. Reynaud, Renzetti,
and Villeneuve (2005) find that the sensitivity of
Canadian residential water demand to a 1
percent increase in price differs according to the
pricing scheme used: demand changes by 0.02
for flat rates and by -0.16, -0.25, and -0.10 for
constant, increasing, and decreasing block rates,
respectively. Thus, the pricing structure per se
plays a significant role in influencing price
responsiveness of residential consumers. 
Finally, although industrial and commercial
water demand has received significantly less
attention than has residential water demand, the
available empirical evidence indicates that firms
respond to water prices just as households do. A
study of water use in the Canadian manu-
facturing sector finds that water intake decreases
by 0.8 percent with each 1 percent increase in
price (Dupont and Renzetti 2001).
Box 1: Water Demand and Prices
Average Monthly Average Monthly Average Monthly
Household Household Household
Average Marginal Expenditure at Expenditure at Expenditure at
Average Constant Price at 10 Cubic Metres 25 Cubic Metres 35 Cubic Metres
Charge 35 Cubic Metres per Month per Month per Month
($ per cubic metre) ($)
1991 0.95 0.98 17.73 26.12 31.96
2004 1.13 1.27 26.08 40.47 50.44
Annual change, 1991–2004 1.35% 2.0% 3.3% 3.9% 4.1%
Table 2: Trends in Municipal Water Prices and Household Expenditures, Canada
Note: All dollar amounts are in constant 2004 dollars.
Source: Environment Canada (2007, 2008).Commentary 281 | 5
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3 This expenditure does not include spending on bottled water or sewage charges. 
and more immediate consequences. The typical
Canadian household charged a flat rate uses an
average of 467 litres per day per person, while the
typical household facing a volumetric price structure
(whether constant, decreasing, or increasing block
rate) uses 266 litres per day per person. Although
these households might differ in other important
respects – such as income or family size – that could
influence their water use, these factors explain some,
but certainly not all, of the observed difference in
demand (see Box 1).
One can also consider recent trends in the levels of
water prices and the expenditures that are associated
with water use in Canada. Water prices have been
rising slowly over the past 15 years. The typical
household with metered water service faced an
average price of $1.13 to $1.27 per cubic metre in
2004 (Table 2) compared to $0.95 to $0.98 in 1991.
Because most households face volumetric charges, in
2004 the average monthly expenditure varied with
the amount consumed, with households consuming
an average volume of water (25 cubic metres per
month) spending $40.47 per month.3Taking infla-
tion into account, monthly expenditures have been
rising steadily at a rate of 3.3 to 4.1 percent per year.
Despite the recent recorded increases in both
water prices and water expenditures, it is important
to recognize how low Canadian water prices are in
comparison to prices in other countries (see Figure
2). There is no obvious reason why Canada should
be the cheapest supplier of water – the technology
of water supply is roughly the same across developed
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Figure 2: International Water Price and Consumption Comparison, 1999
aPurchasing power parity.
bLitres per day per person.
Note: The comparison for 1999 is the most recent available. The National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (1996) has a very similar figure
showing that, in 1989, Canada had the second-lowest prices and the second-highest per capita consumption level.
Source: Expert Panel on Groundwater, forthcoming.economies. Furthermore, as a number of researchers
have documented (see, for example, Bakker 2007),
the apparent abundance of Canada’s water resources
is more firmly rooted in Canadian popular opinion
than in hydrologic science, and the proximity of
water sources to Canada’s major urban centres is
little different than in much of northern Europe.
Indeed, Canada’s climate variability and low pop-
ulation densities mean, if anything, that this
country should have higher-than-average water
prices. The message is startlingly clear: Canadian
water prices are remarkably low by international
standards.
The immediate consequence of these low prices is
also clear: by having such low water prices, Canada
has encouraged its households, farms, and businesses
to be among the heaviest users of water in the world.
Although many factories and farms are not connected
to municipal water systems, provincial regulations
governing water allocation to these “self-supplied”
users have also been criticized for providing water at
subsidized rates (Renzetti 2007). Further, the fact that
this situation has persisted for decades ensures that
these wasteful water-using practices have become
firmly embedded in households’ habits and
appliances and in firms’ productive technologies. 
One piece of evidence in this regard is the measure 
of Canada’s “water productivity” (Postel and Vickers
2004), analogous to the more familiar labour pro-
ductivity concept that measures the value of output
produced by hours worked. Thus, the dollar value of
output produced in Canada by each unit of water 
can be computed and compared with that in other
countries. As Table 3 shows, Canada’s water pro-
ductivity is quite low – comparable to that of
Mexico or Russia but significantly below that of the
United States or Germany.
Pricing Rules
The variety of water-rate structures across Canada is
quite remarkable. How a city comes to have a par-
ticular pricing structure is often difficult to
determine, but is likely a complex result of historical
practice, local politics, adherence to industry rate-
setting principles, accident, and other factors. The
most detailed source of guidance is the widely
followed rate-setting manual of the American
Waterworks Association (AWWA 2000). 
The AWWA approach to water rate setting reflects
an approach to public utility pricing that is quite
different from that adopted by economic analysts. It
begins with a determination of an agency’s “revenue
requirements” – essentially, the agency’s operating and
maintenance and capital costs of service and, hence,
its requirement for revenue in order to break even.
The definition of capital costs varies across juris-
dictions and between privately owned and publicly
controlled agencies. For example, privately owned
agencies commonly include depreciation and a com-
petitive return on their invested capital as a part of
their capital costs, while public agencies tend to
exclude these. The total estimated costs are then
allocated across the services the agency provides and
across customer classes. An important part of this
procedure involves the allocation of joint capital costs
across customer classes. While motivated by the
| 6 Commentary 281
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Country Water Productivity 
(2000 US$ per cubic metre)
India, Peru, China 5-10
Mexico, Russia, South Africa 10-12
Canada 13
United States  18
France, Germany 35-40
Table 3: International Comparison of Water Productivity
Note: Productivity is defined as GDP per unit of recorded water withdrawal.
Sources: Postel and Vickers 2004; the figure for Canada is author's calculation.Commentary 281 | 7
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principle of finding an equitable apportionment of an
agency’s costs across customer classes, this allocation is
fraught with difficulties, as there are many equally ad
hoc ways of dividing joint costs;4 however, it results
in an estimate of the costs for which each customer
class is responsible. Finally, each customer class’s
water-rate schedule is designed so that it collects the
customer class’s revenue requirements while reflecting
any other goals important to the agency. The
resulting rate schedule typically has two components:
a connection fee that is meant to recover the
customer class’s share of the agency’s fixed costs, and 
a volumetric charge that is meant to recover the
variable costs. 
In contrast to the detailed guidance provided by
the AWWA, most Canadian provinces have demon-
strated surprisingly little interest in municipal water
pricing and, until recently, have provided little reg-
ulatory oversight of municipal agencies’ rate-setting
practices aside from requirements regarding debt
levels (see Water Strategy Expert Panel 2005; Furlong
and Bakker 2008). 
Finally, part of the puzzle of how municipalities
arrive at their water rates is a result of the limited
empirical research aimed at identifying the factors
that determine their choice of water-rate structures. A
study of a sample of US municipalities finds that,
under sunnier, warmer, and drier weather conditions,
utilities in the United States are more likely to adopt
increasing-block-rate structures (Hewitt 2000). In
another study, which looks at the structure of
Canadian residential water demand and the decision-
making process municipalities follow in choosing
water-rate structures, the authors conclude that “[the]
choice appears to reflect a combination of efficiency
considerations, equity concerns and, in some cases, a
strategy of price discrimination across consumers”
(Reynaud, Renzetti, and Villeneuve 2005, 1114).
Assessing Water Prices in Canada 
Even a superficial analysis of the current state of water
pricing in Canada, and the rate-setting guidelines
underlying those prices, demonstrates features that
give cause for concern. These include the inadequacy
of revenues, prices that are remarkably low by inter-
national standards, the prevalence of municipalities
with unmetered service, and the lack of seasonal or
distance-related pricing. While these concerns are sig-
nificant enough, it is possible to go further and assess
the economic features and consequences of Canada’s
water prices.
A variety of criteria could be used to carry out such
an assessment. For example, the AWWA suggests that
sufficiency of revenues, promotion of fairness across
users, simplicity of rates, and promotion of con-
servation should be the goals when setting water
prices (AWWA 2000). In a recent paper, I propose
four criteria: revenue generation, economic efficiency,
environmental sustainability, and fairness (Renzetti
2007). Here, however, I take a simpler route and
consider primarily one criterion: do Canadian water
prices promote economically efficient decisionmaking
with respect to Canada’s scarce water resources? The
reasons for focusing on this single criterion are that,
in the past, efficiency has received the least attention
of the various criteria and it is the one that economic
analysis is best suited to consider. 
The main conclusion arising from this assessment
is that municipal water prices in Canada understate
the full costs of water use, a situation that promotes
inefficient decisionmaking by both suppliers and
consumers of water. This inefficient decisionmaking,
in turn, has significant costs for Canadian society that
are manifested in wasteful levels of water con-
sumption, misallocation of scarce infrastructure
funds, degraded water resources, and stifled
innovation. Fortunately, these costs are avoidable and,
in the next section, I suggest potential policy reforms. 
It is useful to divide the general concept of
economic efficiency into allocative and productive
efficiency. Allocative efficiency means that society is
made as well off as possible through the allocation of
its limited resources to producers and consumers.
This general concept has been applied to a number of
specific municipal contexts, including water supply
(see Dewees 2002). With respect to the level of pro-
duction (or consumption) of a good, allocative
4 Indeed, this particular criticism of the AWWA rate-setting method was first made in the seminal work on the economics of water pricing by
Hirshleifer, DeHaven, and Milliman (1960).| 8 Commentary 281
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efficiency occurs when the cost of the last (marginal)
unit of production equals the benefit consumers
enjoy from that unit. Thus, the role of price is to
signal the marginal cost so that consumers can choose
to consume whenever their marginal benefit exceeds
the price.5 Allocative efficiency occurs when con-
sumption and production are aligned so that the
marginal cost equals the marginal benefit and a price
exists that leads this level of production and con-
sumption to be chosen in the market. 
A second, related, concept of efficiency is pro-
ductive efficiency: whatever is the mix of goods and
services that society chooses, production should
occur at the lowest possible cost. This requires that
agencies do two things: produce at the correct scale
and avoid waste. There are several reasons this might
not happen in the case of water agencies. For one,
the small size of a municipality might not allow its
water agency to take full advantage of scale
economies. For another, the management and
organization of the water agency might not lead it
to produce at the lowest possible cost.
If allocative and productive efficiency were the
primary goals for which water agencies should
strive, agencies would need to:
￿ account properly for the full social costs of pro-
duction;
￿ set the price of water equal to the marginal cost
of supply; 
￿ produce the resulting level of output at the
lowest cost; and 
￿ allocate water efficiently when demand equals
the system’s capacity.
Each of these behavioural requirements is discussed
below. 
Full-Cost Accounting
The first requirement for the efficient supply of
water is to account fully for all the costs incurred in
supplying it. Given the complexity of water-agency
operations, the longevity of their capital assets, and
their interaction with the natural environment, it is
not surprising that disagreements arise about how to
measure and record these costs for the purposes of
rate setting. Part of this debate has been about how
best to record capital costs and to compute the
opportunity cost of capital for public agencies (see
Kitchen 2006). More fundamentally, the debate has
concerned the definition of the “full costs” of water
supply. One perspective – adopted by the Walkerton
Inquiry (O’Connor 2002) and Ontario’s Water
Strategy Expert Panel (2005) – argues that full costs
are represented by a complete accounting of all the
expenditures of an agency, including capital and reg-
ulatory costs. This is also the view implicit in
Ontario’s Sustainable Water and Sewage Systems Act,
which requires the province’s water and sewage-
treatment agencies to revise their accounting
procedures so that the full costs of their activities 
are recorded and reflected in prices.
Another perspective argues that full-cost
accounting requires a broader measure of the costs
of water supply, one that includes the opportunity
costs of all productive resources used to supply
water – such as the opportunity costs of raw water
withdrawn by the water agency,6 the costs of pro-
tecting water sources, and the costs of any
reduction in environmental quality that occurs
from the operations of water or sewage agencies. It
is this broader view of full costs that is contained
in the European Union’s Water Framework
Directive, which compels member states’ water
agencies to reform their pricing to reflect the full
costs of their operations (Chave 2002). 
There is very little real-world evidence to indicate
how far existing accounting methods fall short of
either the narrow or the broad definition of full
costs. A recent case study, however, examines the
implications of incomplete cost accounting by con-
sidering the operations of the agency responsible for
water supply and sewage treatment in the Niagara
region (population 410,000) of southern Ontario
(Renzetti and Kushner 2004). The agency supplies
more than 80 million cubic metres of potable water
and treats more than 85 million cubic metres of
sewage. The study finds that, when the full costs of
5 This rule can be generalized when there benefits external to individual consumption – for example, water use improves sanitation and thus
reduces health risks – but the principle remains the same.
6 The opportunity costs of raw water are the lost benefits another user would have enjoyed if the water agency had not withdrawn the water.Commentary 281 | 9
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capital, raw water, and environmental degradation
are considered, the agency’s costs could rise by $10.4
million to $34.9 million, or 16 percent to 55
percent of those actually recorded. Clearly, this is an
area where more data and research are required. 
Marginal Cost Pricing 
The second requirement for the efficient supply of
water concerns water pricing. The fundamental test
for allocative efficiency in a single market is whether
consumption occurs at a level at which the marginal
benefit from consumption equals the marginal cost
of supply. In other words, efficiency is achieved
when people consume to the point where the
benefit they receive from an additional unit of water
equals the cost it took to produce it. In a market
such as that for potable water, where the supplier
sets the price and consumers choose the level of
consumption, meeting this goal requires the water
agency to set the price equal to the marginal cost,
and to supply the resulting demand for water.7
The “marginal” in marginal cost can be defined in
a number of different ways. The most obvious is with
respect to the quantity of water: the price should
reflect the cost of supplying one more unit. Marginal
cost can also be defined with respect to either time or
distance: if the marginal cost of supplying one more
unit of water also depends on when that unit is
delivered (summer vs. winter; morning vs. evening)
or where it is delivered, then the price should reflect
these conditions. Thus, for water, as for other com-
modities, efficient pricing should differ according to
the quantity consumed, the location of consumption,
and the time of consumption. (Efficiency also dictates
that prices vary across customer classes, but only if the
marginal cost of serving them differs.) Remarkably,
although a limited number of municipal water
agencies do have prices that vary by consumption,
almost none differentiates water prices by location or
time of consumption.
There are two reasons to believe that Canadian
water prices do not reflect the marginal costs of
supply. The first is that water agencies do not intend
prices to reflect marginal costs, as highlighted by the
fact that no agency has adopted marginal cost
pricing as a principle in water-rate design. The
second reason is that the empirical evidence, though
limited, shows that prices do not reflect marginal
costs. An early case study of the effects of employing
residential flat-rate price schedules estimated that
the short-run marginal cost of supply in Vancouver,
where residential water use was unmetered, varied
from $4.35 (in constant 1986 dollars) per thousand
cubic metres in the winter to $8.94 in the summer,
while the long-run marginal cost, which included
capital costs, varied from $53.89 in the winter to
$85.83 in the summer. Marginal costs were higher
in the summer due to higher energy costs and lower
water levels in the system’s reservoirs (Renzetti
1992). A more comprehensive study compared
water prices and the estimated marginal cost of
supply for 77 Ontario water agencies, most of
which use some form of volumetric charge for resi-
dential consumers, and found that prices
understated marginal costs for both residential and
non-residential customers by a wide margin
(Renzetti 1999).
Minimizing Costs 
The third requirement for economic efficiency
concerns the cost of providing potable water.
Specifically, two things are required: the agency
must avoid waste, and it must organize its
operations and technology and choose its level of
output so that it operates at the lowest-possible
average cost.8These two conditions are distinct but
closely related. The first requires that, whatever
amount of water the agency supplies, it does not use
more inputs than necessary. The second requires
that the agency find the level of output and scale of
operations that allow it to supply a cubic metre of
water at the lowest-possible average cost. 
There are a variety of ways in which either of
these conditions might not be met. The first facet of
7 In the research on public sector pricing, this simple rule has been extended to meet a number of real-world complications, such as break-
even regulations, uncertain and cyclical supply and demand, water-supply technologies characterized by discrete increments to capacity, 
heterogeneous customer classes, and imperfect information. See, for example, Brown and Sibley (1986); Wilson (1993); and Russell and 
Shin (1996).
8 These are technical conditions rooted in microeconomic theory, where the first condition requires that the agency operate on, rather than
above, its average cost curve, and where the second condition stipulates that the agency operate at the minimum of its average cost curve.| 10 Commentary 281
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productive efficiency considers whether water
agencies are producing their output at least cost or
can find ways to cut their input use while still
providing the same level of service. A recent consid-
eration of the productive efficiency of a sample of
Ontario water agencies operating in 1996 finds that,
after accounting for external factors such as pop-
ulation density and climate variability, a significant
number of agencies do not operate in a cost-min-
imizing fashion (Renzetti and Dupont forth-
coming). Specifically, the average water agency in
the sample could reduce its inputs by approximately
18 percent and still achieve the same level of output.
Furthermore, only 8 out of 64 agencies in the
sample were found to have no economic waste. This
finding suggests that a significant degree of waste
exists among water agencies in Ontario and likely
throughout Canada. 
The second facet of productive efficiency considers
whether water agencies are organized to take
advantage of economies of scale and, thus, to achieve
lower costs of production. For example, suppose there
are four adjacent municipalities whose water agency
each serves a customer base of 25,000 households,
but the technology of water supply in this area
dictates that average costs reach their minimum only
if 100,000 households are served. Productive
efficiency would require that these agencies
amalgamate and lower their average costs and, thus,
their prices. The possibility that small, high-cost
agencies were operating at inefficient levels of service
was a main driver behind a number of the recom-
mendations of Ontario’s Water Strategy Expert Panel.
In its final report, the panel recommended that “[t]he
scale and capacity of systems must increase. Systems
must join together to better manage risks, increase the
depth of their expertise, gain economies of scale and
scope, and help the high-cost customers” (Water
Strategy Expert Panel 2005, 11).
Rationing 
The fourth requirement for economic efficiency
concerns how water should be allocated when
demand threatens to exceed the agency’s rated
capacity to supply water – for example, in times of
drought. In the summer months, it is not
uncommon for a water agency to seek to limit water
use when raw water supplies decline and/or demand
approaches its supply capacity. One extreme example
is the drought that Victoria, British Columbia, expe-
rienced a few years ago. The BC capital region relies
on reservoirs, primarily the Sooke Reservoir, for its
water supply, but winter precipitation in 2000/01 was
only half the average amount, and the lowest since
1900, which dropped reservoir levels by more than
30 percent below normal. As a result, Victoria
instituted a series of measures to curb water use,
including bans or restrictions on most forms of
outdoor water consumption (Walker 2002).
Administrative rationing – such as allowing even-
numbered houses to use water for outdoor purposes
only on even-numbered days or limiting outdoor
water use to specific periods of the day – might seem
straightforward to implement, but it does not
guarantee that scarce water resources will be allocated
to its highest-valued uses. As a result, it typically
results in an inefficient allocation of water. 
Two alternatives might yield a more efficient
outcome. The first is to raise the price of water,
which signals its increased scarcity and value and
provides an incentive for households to reduce their
low-valued uses of water. A recent study comparing
residential outdoor watering restrictions with
drought pricing in various US and Canadian cities
finds that, for a given targeted reduction in water
use, the cost to consumers is lower under drought
pricing than under quantitative water use
restrictions (Mansur and Olmstead 2007). The
main reason for this is that quantitative restrictions
fall on all households, regardless of how they value
their outdoor water use, while price-based
restrictions curtail consumption only for households
that have a low valuation of their outdoor water use. 
The second alternative employs differences in
households’ valuation of access to the supply network.
To illustrate, suppose that, at the beginning of each
year, households could signal to water agencies their
valuation of continued access in times of rationing by
purchasing differing levels of service reliability –
higher levels of service reliability would cost more. As
water supply must be maintained for indoor and fire-
protection needs, this scheme would be applicable
only to outdoor water use. Once households signalled
their respective willingness to pay for reliability, a
ranking of differing households could be established:
the more a household paid for access, the lower the
likelihood that its access would be interrupted orcurtailed. In times of rationing, such a scheme would
ensure that only households that value water the
highest would use the scarce resource, since
households with the lowest valuation would be the
first to be excluded from use. Such a mechanism
could reduce the costs of meeting water-use-
reduction targets (see Collinge 1994). 
Implications 
Of the four requirements for efficient production
and consumption presented above, none is met in
Canada, a finding that has a number of impli-
cations. First, no matter what pricing rule is
employed, to the extent that water agencies’
accounting procedures understate the full costs of
supply, consumption will be artificially subsidized
and, thus, excessive. The costs to society of this
overconsumption are compounded by the costs
associated with water agencies’ operating wastefully
and/or at levels of output that do not exploit
economies of scale. 
The second implication concerns the effects of
prices that fall short of the marginal cost of supply.
The most obvious is the inefficient overuse of water
that subsidized water prices encourage.9The excess
consumption is, of course, most pronounced in cities
that rely on flat rates and whose consumers face a
marginal price of zero. Overconsumption induced by
underpricing water can also be significant, however, in
cities that have volumetric charges. A study of 77
Ontario cities with volumetric charges finds that water
use by residential and nonresidential customers
deviated from levels that would be expected under
marginal cost pricing by 47.5 percent and 62.9
percent, respectively (Renzetti 1999). The results are
summarized in Table 4.
It is important to remember that overuse of water
is possible only when water agencies overexpand the
size of their supply networks. This process is
facilitated by periodic infusions of infrastructure
grants from provincial and federal governments that
are accompanied by few, if any, requirements for
accounting or pricing reforms. In water-scarce envi-
ronments, underpricing typically leads to shortages
and unreliable service. In a relatively water rich envi-
ronment such as exists in parts of Canada,
underpricing has combined with overexpansion of
supply networks, with no reduction in the available
supply or reliability of service. Thus, the strongest
signal of inadequate pricing – shortages – has been
nullified by water agencies’ unwavering commitment
to supply whatever demand arises at the going price. 
The overconsumption of water can also refer to
consuming too much water at a specific time and in
a specific place. It is a well-established principle in
public sector pricing that, when demand varies
cyclically, as in the case of water, efficient prices
should also vary with time. Specifically, water
demand rises during the summer due to the
presence of outdoor watering needs, but water
supplies either remain the same or even decline. If
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water (Renzetti 1992). 
Residential Water Supply Non-residential Water Supply
MCa ($ per cubic metre) 0.87 1.49
PRICEb ($ per cubic metre) 0.32 0.73
DEVc (%) 47.52 62.87
Table 4: Results from Ontario Water-Pricing Study
aMC measures the average of long-run marginal cost estimates across the sample of Ontario municipalities.
bPRICE is the average of residential prices across the sample.
cDEV measures the percentage difference between observed consumption and the consumption predicted to occur if marginal cost pricing were employed.
Source: Renzetti (1999).| 12 Commentary 281
demand rises so much that it is constrained by the
supply network’s capacity during peak periods, the
marginal-cost-pricing rule leads to the use of a peak-
load-pricing formula whereby the price is set at
short-run marginal cost during off-peak periods and
at long-run marginal cost during peak periods. In
this way, consumers face the appropriate signal
whenever they use water. During off-peak periods,
consumption is less than capacity and a small
increase in water use merely incurs additional
variable costs, such as those for raw water, energy,
and chemicals. In peak periods, when consumption
is close to system capacity, an additional increase in
water use requires additional variable and capital
costs. Canadians are already familiar with this type
of pricing with respect to the supply of telecommu-
nications, energy, and even toll highways. 
The difference between prices and short- and long-
run marginal costs is likely to be dramatic. In the case
study of the Vancouver Regional Water District noted
earlier, long-run marginal costs were significantly
higher than short-run marginal costs because the
former included capital costs; moving to peak-load
pricing was predicted to reduce peak demand by 10 to
15 percent (Renzetti 1992). While this does not
sound like a major reduction, it is important to
remember the significance of peak demand when it
comes to designing water networks: like most services
based on capital-intensive supply networks, water
systems typically are built to serve projected peak
demand for consumption and firefighting (see
Ontario 2005). Thus, the failure to curb peak demand
through appropriate prices directly feeds into pressures
to overbuild water supply networks. Ironically, one is
left with a situation where some of the lowest-valued
water uses, such as car washing and lawn watering, are
facilitated by the highest-cost supplies of water. 
Similarly, failure to price according to distance
means that consumers who live farther away from the
supply source are subsidized by those who live closest
to the supply source. Thus, the suburban sprawl
witnessed outside many of Canada’s cities has resulted
partially from a failure to price correctly many forms
of infrastructure and municipal services, including
water. Unfortunately, no empirical studies exist that
establish the extent to which the mispricing of water is
responsible for this phenomenon. 
The final implication of underpricing water is that
it very likely stifles innovation. Consider the business
or household that is asked to spend its scarce resources
to innovate and reduce its water use, but is also told
that it would save little by doing so because the price
of water is so low. In such a case, there would be little
incentive to innovate and save water. Even if a water
user believed that the benefits of conservation
exceeded the costs, could we expect engineers, inven-
tors, and product designers to turn their attention to
reducing the water requirements of appliances and
equipment when no price signal exists to inform them
of the profit opportunities of doing so? 
Statistical evidence exists of the link between
innovation and water prices for all major user
groups. In the United States, for example, increases
in water prices have led farmers to adopt more
efficient irrigation technologies (Renzetti 2002). In
Canada, manufacturing firms are more likely to
invest in equipment that allows them to undertake
internal water recirculation if water intake prices are
higher (Bruneau, Renzetti, and Villeneuve 2007). In
another example, the reaction of households in
California to price and nonprice conservation
measures adopted by water agencies confronted
with repeated droughts has been to curb their water
demand by retrofitting water-using appliances
(Renwick and Green 2000).
It is also instructive to compare and contrast
recent trends in Canadians’ use of water and energy.
Per capita residential water use remained effectively
constant between 1991 (at 341 litres per day) and
1999 (343 litres per day), but fell by 2004 to 329
litres per day (Environment Canada 2004). In
contrast, over the same period, residential energy use
fell by 9 percent from 0.122 petajoules per
household in 1990 to 0.112 petajoules in 2004
(Natural Resources Canada 2006b). Part of this dif-
ference is explained by the difference in trends in
water and energy prices: real residential water prices
rose annually over the period 1991–1999 period by
approximately 2 percent per year, but rose at an
annual rate of 5.5 percent over the 1999–2004
period (Environment Canada 2008), while real resi-
dential energy prices rose by 4 percent per year over
the 1991–2004 period (Natural Resources Canada
2006a).10Thus, there was little decline in water use
C.D. Howe Institute
10 The latter number is a weighted average of residential energy price increases. Natural gas, heating oil, and electricity prices rose 7.5, 2.6, and
0.6 percent, respectively, per year over the 1991-2004 period, and their shares of residential energy use were 41.1, 14.5, and 36.3 percent,
respectively (Natural Resources Canada 2006a).over the first period (1991 to 99), in part because of
income growth combined with a low rate of price
increase, while during the second period (1999 to
2004), water use mimicked energy use 
as both declined in response to significant real 
price increases. 
To summarize, the available evidence demonstrates
strongly that Canadian water agency cost-accounting
and pricing-rules are inefficient. Costs are
understated, and prices fail to reflect marginal costs,
leading to excess consumption, overextended and
undermaintained infrastructure, and stifled
innovation. Although economic efficiency is clearly
not the only criterion by which water prices should
be judged, it is equally clear that the costs of
neglecting this feature of water prices are significant.
Furthermore, future increases in water demand,
coupled with the potential for a reduction in water
supply reliability due to climate change, can only lead
to higher costs from inadequate water pricing. 
Proposals for Reform 
A number of studies have demonstrated the benefits
of moving to efficient water prices. In cities as
diverse as Vancouver, Los Angeles, Sydney, Manila,
and Hyderabad, researchers have demonstrated that
reforming water prices increases social well-being
while encouraging water conservation (Munasinghe
1992; Renzetti 1992; Hall and Hanemann 1996;
Saleth and Dinar 1997; Grafton and Kompas
2007). For example, Renzetti (1992) estimates that
the overall gains from reforming water prices in the
Greater Vancouver Water District could amount to
approximately 4 percent of the community’s total
well-being.11 Moreover, because most policy
reforms create winners and losers, these gains would
be net of the costs of introducing universal resi-
dential water metering in the city. The Vancouver
case study, however, is also instructive in that it
yielded some unexpected results, including the fact
that moving to seasonal peak load prices made
households unambiguously worse off (since their
water prices rose), but improved both the well-being
of local businesses (since their prices fell) and the
welfare of the local water agency (since its costs fell).
Moreover, the Vancouver case study provides
empirical confirmation of the theoretical prediction
of the superiority of marginal cost pricing.
Households were using water they valued much less
than the cost of supplying it. By raising prices, con-
sumption was curbed and the savings to the water
agency and to the taxpayers who fund it far
exceeded the reduction in benefits to water users.
However, the case study also highlights the com-
plexities and challenges facing any agency
considering such a move, and shows that not
enough is known about the likely effects of moving
to marginal cost pricing for water. As a result, I
propose a three-stage approach to policy reform,
with the first stage concentrating on building the
institutional capacity needed to reform water prices.
Build Institutional Capacity 
A substantial amount of work needs to be done
before water agencies are even capable of charging
prices that are based on the marginal costs of supply.
The first requirement is straightforward: universal
metering. Nothing can be done to rationalize
pricing until a water agency has the capacity to
monitor water usage by all its customers.12The
second effort should be directed at accounting more
fully for costs. A valuable starting point is Ontario’s
Sustainable Water and Sewage Systems Act, which will
require full cost accounting by water and sewage
agencies. Related to this, however, is the need to
organize cost accounting in a way that supports the
calculation of marginal costs, since there is a lack of
congruence between agencies’ accounting methods
and their estimation of marginal costs.13 A second
capacity-building effort should be directed at under-
standing the factors that influence water demand.
Although the economic characteristics of water
demand have been studied extensively, a number of
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12 Infrastructure Canada (2005) documents the benefits of metering and the growing interest of Canadian municipalities in its use.
13 Russell and Shin (1996); Dewees (2002); PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003); and Kitchen (2006) are among the researchers that provide
valuable guidance on this topic.features are poorly understood – in particular, how
residential and commercial water demand varies with
respect to changes in energy prices, and the effects of
age, family size, and appliances on water use. 
Provide Near-Term Initiatives 
Once water agencies have developed the capacity to
reform water prices, a number of potentially
valuable steps could then be undertaken. The single
most important near-term strategy would be to
adopt seasonal water pricing, perhaps as part of a
package of price and nonprice measures to
encourage conservation. In the cases where vol-
umetric charges are already in place, this could be
achieved by setting the price in off-peak seasons
equal to short-run marginal costs, setting the price
in the peak summer season equal to long-run
marginal costs (which would be constant across all
user groups), and raising or lowering the connection
fee by an amount necessary for the agency to avoid a
deficit. Such a strategy would provide the correct
signal regarding costs, but it would not require a sig-
nificant change in administration or billing. To
counter any negative effect on low-income
households, only consumption above a certain
quantity might be charged the higher summer price.
Also, it is likely that any effort to curb summer peak
water use through pricing would be more effective if
combined with educational programs and other
nonprice measures (see Brandes, Maas, and
Reynolds 2006). 
There is clearly a role for senior levels of gov-
ernment and industry associations here. It would be
inefficient for individual water agencies to
undertake efforts such as demand studies, marginal
cost calculations, or pricing simulations inde-
pendently of each other. Agencies such as the
Council of Canadian Ministers of the Environment
and the National Roundtable on the Environment
and the Economy are ideally suited to work with
industry by developing costing templates, data col-
lection, research, and the sharing of
best-management practices. A number of the recent
calls for a renewed federal water policy have
emphasized this coordination and information
provision role (see, for example, Morris et al. 2007).
At the provincial level, reforms in cost accounting
and pricing almost certainly would require some
degree of enhanced regulations, such as those seen
already in Ontario. Indeed, the Ontario Expert
Panel’s proposed regulatory framework is worthy of
consideration. The Canadian Water and Wastewater
Association has also made important contributions.
Its rate manual (CWWA 1992) provides a useful
starting point in the design of efficient seasonal
water rates. 
Undertake Long-Run Initiatives 
Once experience with relatively straightforward appli-
cations of marginal cost pricing develops, more
sophisticated efficient-rate structures could be con-
sidered. These include nonlinear price schedules that
reflect changes in marginal costs over the relevant
range of output, satisfy break-even constraints, and
allow water agencies to gain further information on
customers’ characteristics (see Brown and Sibley
1986; Wilson 1993). Consideration could also be
given to efficient rationing methods such as those
discussed earlier. 
In addition, in the long run, accounting and
pricing reforms could be part of a broader set of gov-
ernance reforms concerned with issues such as the
optimal scale of operations, improved transparency in
decision-making and enhanced integration among
local, watershed, and provincial agencies and min-
istries. Particularly important among these reforms is
the need to reorganize local water agencies to enable
them to exploit economies of scale fully and, thus, to
lower costs.14 An important requirement of these
longer-term changes is that they be guided by a
change in water agencies’ operating philosophy. Most
agencies currently view their primary task as
supplying water; if future water use is to be efficient
and sustainable, they need to see their primary task as
balancing the costs of supplying water and the
benefits of its consumption. 
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program at the University of British Columbia, the POLIS group at the University of Victoria, and the Water Policy and Governance Group at
the University of Waterloo. See, for example, Brandes et al. (2006); Bakker (2007) and Furlong (2008). Challenges 
Despite the conceptual and empirical arguments in
favour of marginal cost pricing and the full-cost
accounting needed to support it, few Canadian
water agencies have adopted marginal cost pricing,
and much opposition remains. Perhaps water
agencies are more concerned about ensuring revenue
stability, maintaining seemingly fair rates, and
avoiding the ire of their customers or political
masters. Whatever the reasons for their reluctance to
adopt marginal cost pricing, it is important to
examine the challenges water agencies face in doing
so, two of which are the potential effect on low-
income households and the practical difficulties that
confront water agencies considering such a move. 
Perhaps the most serious concern facing the
reform of water prices in Canada is the potential
negative effect on low-income households. This
concern stems from the possibility that any effort to
reform prices would harm the poor dispropor-
tionately more than others since they likely spend a
larger proportion of their income on water supplies.
But does this necessarily mean that the poor would
be harmed by a move to marginal cost prices? 
Fortunately, the answer need not be yes, for two
reasons. First, for many low-income households, a
move to marginal cost pricing might lead to a
reduction in water bills. Burke, Leigh, and Sexton
(2004) point out that more than three million
Canadian households are in towns and cities with
volumetric water-rate structures that include a
minimum monthly charge that reflects a volume of
water use greater than the normal residential level.
Reducing or eliminating that monthly charge
could lower water bills for many households (such
as seniors) that use relatively low volumes of water.
The second reason is that water-rate reform could
deliberately avoid harming low-income
households.15 It is worthwhile to consider one
real-world example where this was achieved. Hall
and Hanemann (1996) report that Los Angeles
appointed a panel of experts to investigate the
reform of water prices as part of a broader strategy
to address the city’s recurring water-supply
problems. The panel made several important rec-
ommendations, one of which was to switch away
from conventional public utility cost accounting
and toward the economically more meaningful
marginal cost accounting. Another was to adopt
sophisticated price structures that would better
reflect the cost of supply to different parts of the
city, different climate conditions, and even
different lot sizes. At the same time, the panel,
aware of the potential effects of rate reform on
low-income households, recommended that some
of the excess revenue generated by the proposed
increasing-block-rate structure be used to subsidize
water consumption by low-income consumers.
The second significant challenge facing the
reform of water prices in Canada concerns the
practical difficulties confronting water agencies.
Many features of their operations, such as data col-
lection, demand forecasting, cost accounting,
project assessment, and asset management are not
geared to promoting an efficient level of output
through marginal cost pricing. Ontario’s recent leg-
islation requiring the adoption of full-cost
accounting and pricing and the establishment of
asset-management plans requires significant oper-
ational and administrative changes. It should be
possible to go further, however, and design a reg-
ulatory environment in which agencies are rewarded
for their efforts toward encouraging innovation, cost
saving, and improved customer service. Here,
guidance and assistance from agencies such as the
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment
and the National Roundtable on the Economy and
Environment would facilitate innovation and avoid
duplication of effort. 
A related potential challenge arising from the shift
to efficient prices is the possibility of greater revenue
variability. Although this is unlikely to be a sig-
nificant problem for agencies that already rely on
volumetric prices, it would pose a more significant
challenge for agencies that use flat rates to earn their
revenues. It is important to remember, however, that
an efficient pricing structure is likely to have a fixed
component (to recoup fixed costs), in addition to a
volumetric component (that reflects marginal costs).
This fixed component would provide a significant
degree of revenue certainty for water agencies. In
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addition, enhanced modeling of water demand
would improve agencies’ ability to predict demand
and, thus, revenues. 
Summary
It is disheartening to realize that many of the
arguments regarding the costs of mispricing water
and the need to rationalize those prices were made
as long ago as 1985, in the report of the Inquiry on
Federal Water Policy (Pearse, MacLaren and
Bertrand 1985), and subsequently articulated in a
statement of federal water policy in 1987. Thus, it
was already clear more than 20 years ago that the
underpricing of water, combined with senior gov-
ernments’ periodic infusion of infrastructure
financing, was fuelling overconsumption by
households and firms and overbuilding of supply
networks by water agencies, and had pushed
Canada to the bottom of international rankings of
water efficiency. 
There is a plethora of evidence – conceptual, sta-
tistical, and case-study based – that reforming water
agency cost accounting and pricing provides real
benefits. Efficient prices provide an invaluable signal
to consumers and producers alike of the scarcity and
value of all the inputs used to supply Canadians
with potable water. Properly calculated, they also
signal when expansions to supply capacity are truly
warranted. 
Such a transition would not be without
challenges and difficulties, including defining and
measuring marginal cost; making agencies’
accounting procedures compatible with economic
principles of costing; developing the institutional
capacity to develop efficient prices; anticipating
consumers’ responses to price changes and con-
vincing them of the benefits of realistic pricing; and,
finally, avoiding the negative distributional effects
that might follow from reform.
The alternative, however, is continued waste,
overconsumption, and lack of innovation. This
Commentary has provided a multistage set of policy
reforms that could help to make the transition to an
efficient and sustainable water industry. The most
important of these reforms are as follows:
￿ continue the trend toward universal residential
water metering; 
￿ move to full-cost accounting; 
￿ institute seasonal surcharges to better reflect the
marginal costs of water use during peak summer
months; and
￿ amalgamate smaller, high-cost water agencies to
exploit scale economies and promote
innovation.Commentary 281 | 17
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